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What Is the Factor That Is Really Important Here?

I am not convinced of the intrinsic worth of "letting" vs. "doing." It seems to me, that in all cases, there are other more weighty normative factors in play that make one action morally better than another, and it is not this factor which is actually doing any of the work. I don’t mean to deny the distinction...for I believe it is there, and it is a plausible thing to say afterwards; instead I deny its relevance, in light of its ability to explain the moral weight effectively. Think about this statement: I am willing to concede that pushing a person into a pond is morally worse than merely failing to save someone from drowning. Why is this so? Is your first answer "because in one situation involves killing and the other involves letting die?" Mine isn’t. That IS an answer, but it’s not the one that really provides the moral weight to the situation. If, outside of the conversation about "letting/doing" someone posited that scenario and asked why which one was worse, I would say: "It takes a whole different moral character and set of intentions to push someone into a lake, than it does to merely let someone already in the lake drown." Or, more simply, it takes a different kind of person to do one act over the other. The reason one act is worse than the other is because of the set of morally relevant factors behind what it takes to "do" as opposed to what it takes to "let". It is not the doing or letting in and of itself that effectually matters. (Notice that Richard Trammell’s piece is NOT on the moral significance of letting vs. doing, but the significance of "negative and positive duties" that go with letting/doing. Trammell himself had to go elsewhere to find what was really giving weight to the situation.)
The ultimate disutility of letting/doing is shown most vividly by Tooley’s diabolical machine example: "Imagine a machine which contains two children, John and Mary. If one pushes a button, John will be killed, but Mary will emerge unharmed. If one does not push the button, John will emerge unharmed but Mary will be killed. In the first case one kills John, while in the second case one merely lets Mary die" (qtd. In Trammell). In this case the ONLY factor that differs is that of letting vs. doing...and it does not make any either situation more appealing than the other. I argue, that any like case, where letting or doing is the sole factor of difference between the two options, one has absolutely nothing relevant to say of the moral worth of one situation over the other.
Even in cases like what I call "the bathtub objection" where there is a strong motive to kill someone and in one world the subject drowns the person, the other world they are merely very pleased to find them already drowning, and let them go. Trammell objects to cases of this type by saying that there is a "sledgehammer effect" or a simple overpowering of other factors. However, the very fact that letting vs. doing is so easily overpowered brings into question its actual relevance. For I believe it can be overpowered even in the case of pushing someone into a lake that I initially described. Actually, I think It can be overpowered in every case where the distinction occurs, because it is not the distinction itself that is morally relevant. Show me a case of two morally different acts where there is no other more compelling normative factor than letting vs. doing that might actually be doing the work of your prima facie intuition that makes the moral distinction. Show me a case where letting vs. doing is the only real factor of difference where one can actually say something of worth morally one way or the other.
Even if I were to concede letting vs. doing was of real moral significance, it would only be extrinsically so, and not a real intrinsic normative factor. For it could be argued that because it takes different characters etc. to do than it does to let, there must be some morally significant difference between the two. However, this only convinces me that letting vs. doing is instrumentally significant to determining other morally weighty factors. For, it remains to be convincing that knowing whether or not a person "let happen" or "did" is what actually moves our moral intuitions.

Does guilt or innocence change what we are permitted to do to people? In the cases where we know the guilt or the innocence of the party then I think it is right that it does. For example were I to keep forgetting my posts, Dr. Sorensen would be correct in penalizing my grade. In this situation because I am guilty of not posting as often I should, anything that would have been reasonably constraining Dr. Sorensen would be removed and he may do as he will. Though I am not certain if I have captured the essence of that I want to say; also it does not seem that this was a very good example. Suppose for example we have a number of convicted criminals; by way of their vice they have caused some injury to society therefore we me be justified in depriving them of their civil rights for such a time as they are "paying their dues to society". One might even say that by their criminal acts they have broken the accord between citizen and state and as such automatically forfeit their rights by going outside of them in the first place. Thus the constraint we might have to respect the civil rights of a particular individual is removed by way of their guilt.
Whether or not one actually forfeits one's civil rights upon comitting a criminal act
is in this case irrelevant, I merely wished to point out a case in which guilt might be a relevant factor in constraint. It seems though that there are many situations where guilt or innocence might be a factor if we only knew how they applied. For example, say that a Nazi Officer moves to Argentina and becomes a farmer. People might treat the man like every other Argentine farmer and as such might be constrained from taking his land, killing his cattle, et cetera. Say that we never find out about this man's dark past and that he contributes to the local society and doesn't cause any trouble. Unless he made a point of telling anyone, no one would know that he was responsible for x number of tortures and killings. Knowing would only make apparent whether or not one was still constrained by morality regardless of whether or not you actually are. For all practical purposes in this situation we are still justified in being constrained by morality because we do not know that this man has the past that he does. So it is no wrong(in the ordinary sense) to not impinge on his well being, civil rights et cetera.

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What? Jen is talking about Euthanasia? How shocking!!

Today in class we talked about a variety of things that I think played into a topic I am very interested about, euthanasia. One thing in particular was the discussion of the Mill concept that Kelly brought up, a choice that takes away choice making power should not be allowed. In believing and employing this concept, are we not taking away someone’s freedom of choice? What if being bossed around and told what to do raises someone’s well-being? I do believe there is an objective list (in the theory of well-being), but I also think that mental states and desire satisfaction are two of the things on this list. What if being bossed around was a big enough desire, and raised their mental states enough to outweigh something like freedom of choice? In this case it would seem that freedom of choice would lower the person’s well-being. Would it not be more beneficial to the person if they became a slave? I think it would.
This concept also poses another problem for me. If I were to agree with it then it would have the implication that I could not be pro-euthanasia. I am very intrigued by the topic of euthanasia and I support it as long as there are certain checks and balances in place to stop abuse of it. If I were to say “no one is allowed to make a choice that will take away their ability to make free choices again” I would have to say that I did not support euthanasia. I think this is an inherent implication of Mill’s view, and I believe it is a wrong one. Euthanasia would effectively take away one’s ability to make a free choice, because it results in the person’s death. If being a slave would heighten someone’s well-being so greatly, and if euthanasia would end severe suffering, then I do not see how it is right or good to take away someone’s right to chose those options.

The boy who did lose his leg

I want to apologize in advance if this post lacks the normal amount of arguing these posts are meant to have. I was sort of out of it in class today because in the argument of what to do when someone is in an accident and needs to have their leg cut off hits home with me a bit. It is an argument I face in my life every time I talk to my friend Nick. To this day, almost 2 years later, I still can't come up with an answer. Nick, also the one I mentioned who has a dead arm, did lose his leg (through his knee and below) in a car accident. Nick, as Kelly tried to do with me and running, lived to ski and race cars. He cannot participate in either of those sports anymore. He is attempted at getting back into both, but so far it has been failure after failure. Every time I talk to him I cannot tell if he wanted to live through that accident or not. Every day is filled with pain both phsyically and emotionally for him. He tells me of how he wish he just died. He is surrounded with friends and family, but no one can truly understand or really make things better for him. I am so glad he lived. He also has days in which he is just as glad, but I'd say there are more when he's really down. So when we brought up the argument of what to do I was really torn. On the one hand, I think we should cut off the leg to save the life no matter what. If Nick wasn't in my life, that would be my answer hands down. The life is important, and in time the person will thank you no matter what the loss. In addition to the individual his or herself, the family and friends will be so thankful. When someone dies it is not just the individual affected, everyone who knows the person is affected. However, with Nick in my life it makes it a hard decision for me. I've been there with him through everything. He's practically a member of my family. I'm the only one he trusts to talk to. Every time he talks to me about how much pain he is in, how hard things are for him, how much he wishes things were different, how much he misses skiing and racing, I just don't know what to do. I'm so glad he's still around, but how selfish am I being? For anyone who has ever seen the movie Garden State, Zach Braff's character makes a good point towards the end of the movie that maybe all his mom wanted was for everything to be over (she was in a wheel chair and died in the bathtub). I just don't think I have an answer. Life happens, and I guess we all just have to try to do the best we can. Again, I apologize for lacking the normal ethical arguments, but this is all I could get out.

Bill B and Objective Consequences

For this post, I’m going to try to show that Bill B didn’t actually do anything wrong. I’m doubtful that it can be done, but I want to try, in part for kicks and in part because I feel that the following argument is strangely strong. Imagine a world in which Bill is the only person. If he gets drunk and decides to drive, presumably we don’t think he’s done anything wrong. If we imagine adding more people to this scenario, Bill does something wrong, according to common sense morality. Bill B is culpable because he irresponsibly runs a high risk of harming someone else. At the risk of sounding trivial, I’ll ask: why is running a high risk of harming someone else bad? It must be because harming someone is intrinsically bad, since high risks aren’t bad in and of themselves. This seems to be a point in Bill B’s favor: he hasn’t done anything intrinsically bad: his fault lies in doing something that tends to lead to something bad. In this case, it didn’t.

Recall the bathtub cases from discussions about killing and letting die? In those cases, I (and at least a few others) thought that both inheritors were equally bad for the reason that both came into the bathroom with the intention to kill the kid. If we are inclined to look at motives and intentions as the foundation to morality, Bill B also seems to come away clean. His motives could have spanned the gamut from horrendous to exemplary, depending on his aim in driving. Bill B’s act of driving drunk is not tied to a particular motive. Thus, on both the action and intention accounts, Bill B seems to come away pretty well.

Bill's, Goods, Rights, and Purple Font!

So since class I have spent a lot of time trying to figure out why deep down I feel like Bill A (the Bill who hits someone) deserves a larger punishment than Bill B (the lucky one who doesn't hit anyone). I hate thinking that justice is determined by luck, but I feel that despite my best efforts it will boil down to that. Going off of a couple different theories discussed in class I've come up with a rough theory of why Bill A deserves a harsher punishment. As we have discussed there is the subjective and objective views of morality. I feel that most people do not feel the need to choose one but rather use a combination of the two. If we look at it in terms of subjectivism looking at right versus wrong in one's intentions and objectivism looking at good versus evil in the actual results of one's actions, then we can combine these ideas to get one joint theory. Bill B did something morally and subjectively wrong in taking such a huge risk. However, the actual results of Bill B's actions did not lead to something evil in the killing of anyone. Bill A did the same wrong thing, while also causing evil in the killing of someone. Although morally both Bills did something wrong, only Bill A caused something evil. We can further Introduce a Bill C into the picture, a Bill that was not drunk or tired. This Bill however, hit someone anyone through no real fault of his own. This Bill did nothing morally wrong at all; however, his actions produced something evil. What should is punishment be? I feel that when someone does something morally wrong or whose actions lead to something evil in the world then they should be punished. However, when someone does something both wrong and that leads to evil, the punishment is increased dramatically. Bill B and Bill C need to take responsibility for their actions. Bill B took a large risk and did something wrong and should be punished. Bill C, though not through his own fault, caused a death, and owes at least something to the world, whether it be doing something for the family or something else. Bill A however, did something wrong and caused evil, and these two facts together are reason enough to punish him further. As far as the luck of Bill A and Bill B, I don't know what to say. Maybe it is pure luck that Bill B did not hit anyone. I don't like that luck is such a huge part of it, but I feel that it's just the nature of the universe and there is not much the Bills or anyone else can really do about it. Maybe that's a copout on the problem of luck, but that's all i got right now.

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Eat Chinese Mustard and Cry!

I just chose that title because it’s fun to say, and it was the biggest thing I had written in my notebook. I’d like to spend some time, wether or not it be about deontology (it most certainly is in some way related), to talk about the importance of acts opposed to the consequences of those acts. I believe, it was one day last year in Good Vs. Right when we were doing the "run down of moral weighty-type things" when someone said "good consequences" someone else said "intuitions, or character etc." and then when pressed for another option I leaned foreword and said "well, it seems to me there should at least be some weight on what you actually DO". This does not mean that I hold this view explicitly or really want to back it up...I just think it’s morally interesting. And if it’s slightly misleading to ascribe that belief to the deontoligist, well, so be it, that’s what I want to talk about anyway (if anything I want to talk about it because it appears to be one more thing in the long and grievous list of stuff Kagan skips over.)
I would like to add to the list of things that are morally significant "things you actually DO". Not what the consequences of those acts are, not the "make up" which leads you to them (which is a position I will probably take later, or combine with this one...or some such, because after all, it is Aristotelean. And we all know Aristotle is my baby) but what one DOES. It seems to me, at least in common sense morality, this issue holds quite a lot of sway.
For instance, with the nose punching vs. head chopping. While in both cases the person ends up dead...that is irrelevant to the fact that it is much more grievous to cut off someone’s head than it is to punch them in the nose. (At least from this common sense point of view.) I think, foregoing the weight of intentions/character etc. the person who kills by chopping off someone’s head is much worse off morally than someone who kills by punching in the nose. If the nose puncher indeed knew what she was doing when she punched the guy in the nose, then they are still culpable for murder. Ohhh I used the word culpable, that sounds like I’m a dessert (pumpkin pie) theorist...but dessert (coconut cream tart) aside, both are ACTS of murder, so both are bad. But one is the ACT of cutting off someone’s head. This is certainly much worse than punching someone’s nose. Especially if you apply the virtue/vice/intention theory, because one would have to be much more callous and much more cruel of intent to have the guts to saw through someone’s neck than a person who simply punches someone in the nose.
The distillation of my argument goes something like this: It takes a lot more guts and moral grime to cut off someone’s head than it does to punch someone’s nose out. No matter the consequences, the head chopper is the worse moral offender.

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Good vs. Right (like that course I took once...)

Sorry I'm late in posting, I completely forgot I was supposed to be an "initiator" this week. Anyway, I’d like to raise an issue about objective rightness vs. goodness of an action that I don’t think was given much attention in class. This is something, admittedly that I’ve stolen from previous classes with Kelly, but I think it’s interesting. This has to do mainly with a theory of Objective worth, as opposed to Subjective worth.
Often an argument against the "objective rightness" view is that it doesn’t leave much room for fairness. Eg. Someone could do something that is by all considerations of available data, what appears to be the best outcome subjectively, but still be wrong. Like in the baby Hitler example; it seems like the right thing to do is to save the baby (assuming the future is still unknown) because all facts at hand considered, it is the good thing to do. When objectivists say that this is wrong because of the unknown facts, this is an unfair expectation of morality (to know the impossible facts, eg. That the baby is going to grow up to kill lots of innocent Jews).
Despite the regret argument, this is where I think the objective theorist can save herself. It requires a comparison of the values "right and good". It seems to me, someone could have done what was good, but that good was the wrong thing to do. One could do a graphic representation where one axis is goodness of a thing, and another axis is rightness. Some people might believe that dots of worth can only fall in the sector that is both positively good and positively right (or positively wrong, and positively bad) Eg. (Numbered right to left/top to bottom) the sectors II and III. (that all things that are good, are right...which I believe would be likened to hedonism) however, it may be that dots of value on this graph could fall in any sector. When something falls in sectors I or IV, it is a case of mixed values. An action in these sectors would be good but wrong (sector IV) or bad but right (sector I). This is closer to an objective list theory that I would support.
This is illustrative of the objective list theorists reply that it’s "not blame but right and wrong". I can say that, yes...what you did was good. You saved a life. But ultimately, it was also wrong, because in saving that life you indirectly killed millions of jews. So, I guess I’m saying the available subjective facts may be more privy to what is good and bad...and what the objectivist has to say about these two parts of the graph is not very interesting, or it’s problematic in that it can lead to unfair expectations. But, it seems to me that the person who is good but wrong (that saved the baby) is not anywhere worse off than someone who did the bad but right thing. (To let the baby drown) (There need be no implicit premise here about which value holds the most sway [that rightness is better than goodness or vice-versa]). They still, have something to regret on their conscience...and, as objected, it is not possible to know if the drowned baby was indeed going to grow up to be Hitler if the baby drowned.
Although it would be arguably better to be both right and good. This is not always possible. And I do not think morality holds someone as any worse for messing up in one respect or the other (although you will objectively be not as well off, and this is just a sad fact of life). It is only when you have done something both subjectively bad and objectively wrong that morality should really start shaking its finger...or something like that. I’m not sure if I got that as clear and as I thought it would be. It’s probably full of muckiness, and objection-ability, but I’m okay with that. Discuss!

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Corsica insula est.

As I mentioned earlier I am not a particular fan of desert and here I am going to attempt to figure out why. sorry I'm late with this post, I got distracted with my Latin homework. Anyway the idea that one should decide to help someone on the basis of whether or not they are deserving seems wrong. I am willing to entertain the possibility that when someone's well being isn't so great that it is not such a great breeding ground for ethical action. An increase in well being may well be the basis for a change in the way someone lives one life. Perhaps this can be illustrated by the prison ministry; in particular I have in mind the example of Malcolm X. Whilst Malcolm was in prison he was introduced to Islam and his life changed dramatically, so much so that he became a prominent figure in the civil rights movement and recent American history in general. I think it is right to say that the adoption of Islam increased Malcolm's well being and with it his moral worth as a human being.
Or along similar lines the character Jean Valjean in Les Miserables is saved from arrest by the local Bishop and given candlesticks among other valuable items. The Bishop by increasing Valjean's wealth and preventing his arrest increased Valjean's well being overall. This allowed Valjean's life to take a great turn for the better and later in life he himself becomes well known for his generosity and goodness. Surely, the thief Valjean would not have deserved the help that the Bishop gave him, but what of the later rich and generous Mayor Valjean? The Bishop knowing that the thief Valjean was "unworthy" gave him succor with great success.
Therefore I see such examples as sufficient enough reason to help other people where I can.

However I have neglected whether the more interesting case. That is the case where all things being equal except that one person has great potential for good and the other great potential for evil. One would think that one should necessarily help the good and increase that person's well being. Though I should wonder if instead we should not help the one prone to evil as a single merciful act can go a long way thus contributing to the greater good. It is an intrinsic good that one should be turned from evil to good. In addition even if the person does not realize that he has been helped, he has another opportunity to change, to become worthy and to help others.

Sparkles and Rainbows

I do not agree with the retributivist in their view that some people deserve to suffer. I believe that every person, regardless of their past wrong doing has the ability to change and become better, therefore I believe that while people deserve punishment for their crimes, they do not deserve to suffer. No one deserves more than just their fair punishment, and I do not believe that fair punishment could entail suffering. Justice, someone getting their just deserts, is important, however only instrumentally. It can serve to deter future wrong doing.

Suffering seems to me to be the prolonged lessening of someone’s well-being. This prolonged exposure to a severe lack of well-being will play into someone’s negativity, and quite possibly make greater the previous negativity that caused them to do wrong in the first place. If the person is not allowed to get rid of their negativity, and they are subject only to more negativity then how are they to be expected to ever reform. I believe that someone should be given a slight increase to their well-being, like we discussed in class, such as a flower or a good book. I believe that this would raise their spirits enough to perhaps set them on a path to reform, therefore lessening the morally negative population. Isn’t a person more apt to snap at their friend or break a glass if they are constantly subjected to negative stimuli, such as lack of sleep or lack of respect? I believe so. And isn’t it usually that if a person in such a negative mood gets a smile, or a surprise good happens to them their mood lightens, their well-being goes up, and they are more apt to act nicely towards other and not perform more negative acts? I believe this as well, hence I believe that people, while they do deserve to get their just deserts, I believe that their just deserts do not involve suffering, and they do deserve a chance to reform through shared positivity and (granted slightly) increased well-being.

Kagan - What exactly is desert?

I enjoyed Shelly Kagan’s piece “Comparative Desert” for several reasons. Kagan is a very clear thinker and writer. I am a visual learner, so the graphs made his points clearer. However, Kagan did not convince me that there is such a thing as comparative desert, or at least, completely optimistic comparative desert. I realize that many people come into the discussion with the intuition that comparative desert exists. For whatever reason, I do not. Thus, I saw Kagan’s piece as an attempt to convince the few like me who don’t intuitively go for comparative desert.

I have several objections to Kagan, but prior to those, I want to make sure I understand his view. And here, the first complaint arises. What is the metaphysical status of desert? I realize that this is not a course on metaethics; my question is intended to be analogous to Dr. Sorensen’s “periodic table of ethical elements”. Does Kagan believe that desert is part of the periodic table?

When I first read him, I thought that Kagan was placing desert somewhere else. With statements like “I take it as… a good thing – other things being equal – if people get what they deserve” and “what they deserve more of is well-being. The more virtuous deserve to be better off…”, I took Kagan as a welfarist who is examining desert as a non-personal factor in judging possible worlds to be better or worse. If he thought that desert was part of judging a person’s life to be better or worse, wouldn’t he include that qualification when talking about desert, and also avoid using “better off” as a synonym for “well-being”?

I believe that understanding this properly is essential later on in Kagan’s paper to determining the success of his arguments. Unfortunately, I lack the space here to show the way these hang together and motivate my substantial objections to Kagan.

I, like most of the class, am of the breed that does not feel that anyone really deserves to suffer no matter how horrible of a person they are. That is seen in my opposition to capital punishment. In my personal opinion, I feel it is good to try to give the murderer in jail the flowers as discussed in class. I say this for a number of reasons. First off, the person that makes the attempt at increasing the well-being of the murderer is often seen as a very good person. It is easy and fun to give to your favorite people in your life, but when one makes the effort to reach out to someone who isn't so pleasant a higher sense of morality can be seen. Another reason that I find it positive to increase the well-being of the murderer is that often times the murderer who is genuinely touched by such a kind act is also the type who shows great remorse. When a person is put into jail for life and begins to regret their actions, I do not see a greater punishment that can be given than the punishment they are putting themself through. For someone to attempt to brighten their day up even a little seems to be positive to me when the murderer is putting himself through more suffering than I feel any one person deserves. I do recognize that this is not always the case. There are plenty of people in jail who feel no remorse at all for their actions. My argument regarding these people is simple. The people who feel no remorse are generally cruel, cold people. The truly terrible people in the world that aren't punishing themselves at all aren't going to really be touched by a generous act anyway. The morality of the giver still increases, but the well-being of the cold-hearted murderer will probably stay approximately the same. I think it is important to hold people responsible for their actions, but I do not find any reason to make them suffer anymore than they already will be living in jail.

Interpersonal comparisons of well-being

Kagan states “so I am inclined to think that any general skepticism about the possibility of making interpersonal comparisons of well-being is probably misguided.”

I believe that skepticism about this issue is acceptable due to the fact that you can never know all of the factors affecting a person’s well-being. I will illustrate this with the case of Persons A, B, and C. Persons A and B are friends, close friends, but B is manipulative and sneaky. B decides that A is not good enough to be friends with and so leaves A. A is at the moment very upset, but A also no longer has someone manipulating and using him. In my opinion, and I believe most people would agree, A’s well-being has actually gone up. C now comes along and sees how upset A is. C did not know B well, therefore C believes that A’s well-being is now lower than before because C cannot see the inherent goodness in B’s leaving.

In many cases, as discussed in class, interpersonal comparisons of well-being are relatively practical and they can be done. However, there are cases such as this in which one cannot, due to epistemic limitations, make sound interpersonal comparisons. It is not practical to make them, and base all of your ideas upon them, because you do not really have a way to know if you have all of the knowledge you need to make such a comparison. In many extreme cases you do not need to know all of the factors involved in one’s well-being, but most cases in life are not those of extremes. We are usually making well-being comparisons in our every day lives, concerning those people who are in our familiar surroundings. Therefore the practicality of these comparisons lessens because in such close and homogenous surroundings one must take into consideration the hidden factors of a person’s well-being.

Over all the comparing and contrasting the well-beings of various people and determining who has the greater complaint seems trivial. I suppose it is merely the language of this that throws me. I have to ask though how it matters who has the greater complaint? It seems enough for people to work for the general well-being of all and that the greatest wellbeing of the greatest number of people has precedence. I am not a fan of utilitarian theories but when determining how to handle the greatest good for the greatest number of people it many times seems like there is little other way to go. I really don’t have anything to say on this.

An Objection to Parfit's View

For this entry, I will defend the objective list theory (OLT). Although I am still uncommitted at this point, I tend towards the OLT. Derek Parfit’s view in our excerpt of “Reasons and Persons” is not an OLT, but a hybrid, combining the OLT and the mental states theory (MST). His hybridization is a result of his belief that “each put forward as sufficient something that was only necessary.” My goal here is to defend the OLT by showing that it is indeed sufficient. It might be useful to quote the most salient part of Parfit’s view: “And, if they are entirely devoid of pleasure, there is no value in knowledge, rational activity, love, or the awareness of beauty. What is of value, or is good for someone, is to have both; to be engaged in these activities, and to be strongly wanting to be so engaged.”
I want to bring up something that wasn’t raised in class. Beyond the intuition that a life with most of the items on the OL but not pleasure, I believe that there is an active reason why Parfit’s view is wrong. Take the case of a dreaded course in college, and analyze it from Parfit’s perspective. One has no incentive to attempt to really learn the material in the course for an intrinsic reason. (This is assuming that the choice will not affect mental states.) Instead, one would choose to “get by”, by studying as little as possible and learning as little as possible to pass with a sufficient grade. By doing this, one would have more time to dedicate to the things that make one happy. However, I firmly believe that actually learning the material (and the discipline required to learn an uninteresting topic) would increase one’s well-being. Parfit appears committed to advising the hypothetical student to not really learn the course if learning it won’t make the student happy.

Redefining hedonism

I never have seen myself as a hedonist; however, I also have been finding it relatively easy to argue some of their points. I feel that I want to believe that all acts do not necessarily boil down to pleasure, but I am finding more and more that they do. In the case of the undesired Physics class, while the class itself may not have been pleasurable, it's purpose was. The purpose of receiving an education, of fulfilling a requirement for graduation, and of discovering whether or not medicine or science was the field for you are all pleasurable results. It is often questioned whether or not any act is truly selfless. The argument is that even if the act is hurtful to onesself there is always a deeper pleasure gained whether it be the pleasure of helping another or the pleasure of doing what you find to be a morally just act. The act of donating blood, the needle and the weak feeling afterwards is not pleasurable. However, after donating blood one feels good about themselves for helping to save someone's life. Perhaps I am not coinciding completely with hedonism in the utilitarian quest for the maximum amount of pleasure with the minimum amount of pain or work. However, I do find it possible to find some sort of pleasure in every act one intentionally goes about. Where i stray from hedonism is in that I feel that there are different weights that can be attributed to different types of pleasure. I find myself combining the amount of pleasure with the amount of meaning or fulfillment it brings about as Zac was discussing. I'm not sure I want to take the step to the objective list theory quite yet, but rather I find myself redefining hedonism to include the fulfillment one gets out of giving blood or climbing a mountain in order to put it on the same if not a higher level than sitting around and watching television.