Ursinus Normative Ethics Blog

Tuesday, September 05, 2006

Interpersonal comparisons of well-being

Kagan states “so I am inclined to think that any general skepticism about the possibility of making interpersonal comparisons of well-being is probably misguided.”

I believe that skepticism about this issue is acceptable due to the fact that you can never know all of the factors affecting a person’s well-being. I will illustrate this with the case of Persons A, B, and C. Persons A and B are friends, close friends, but B is manipulative and sneaky. B decides that A is not good enough to be friends with and so leaves A. A is at the moment very upset, but A also no longer has someone manipulating and using him. In my opinion, and I believe most people would agree, A’s well-being has actually gone up. C now comes along and sees how upset A is. C did not know B well, therefore C believes that A’s well-being is now lower than before because C cannot see the inherent goodness in B’s leaving.

In many cases, as discussed in class, interpersonal comparisons of well-being are relatively practical and they can be done. However, there are cases such as this in which one cannot, due to epistemic limitations, make sound interpersonal comparisons. It is not practical to make them, and base all of your ideas upon them, because you do not really have a way to know if you have all of the knowledge you need to make such a comparison. In many extreme cases you do not need to know all of the factors involved in one’s well-being, but most cases in life are not those of extremes. We are usually making well-being comparisons in our every day lives, concerning those people who are in our familiar surroundings. Therefore the practicality of these comparisons lessens because in such close and homogenous surroundings one must take into consideration the hidden factors of a person’s well-being.

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