Good vs. Right (like that course I took once...)
Sorry I'm late in posting, I completely forgot I was supposed to be an "initiator" this week. Anyway, I’d like to raise an issue about objective rightness vs. goodness of an action that I don’t think was given much attention in class. This is something, admittedly that I’ve stolen from previous classes with Kelly, but I think it’s interesting. This has to do mainly with a theory of Objective worth, as opposed to Subjective worth.
Often an argument against the "objective rightness" view is that it doesn’t leave much room for fairness. Eg. Someone could do something that is by all considerations of available data, what appears to be the best outcome subjectively, but still be wrong. Like in the baby Hitler example; it seems like the right thing to do is to save the baby (assuming the future is still unknown) because all facts at hand considered, it is the good thing to do. When objectivists say that this is wrong because of the unknown facts, this is an unfair expectation of morality (to know the impossible facts, eg. That the baby is going to grow up to kill lots of innocent Jews).
Despite the regret argument, this is where I think the objective theorist can save herself. It requires a comparison of the values "right and good". It seems to me, someone could have done what was good, but that good was the wrong thing to do. One could do a graphic representation where one axis is goodness of a thing, and another axis is rightness. Some people might believe that dots of worth can only fall in the sector that is both positively good and positively right (or positively wrong, and positively bad) Eg. (Numbered right to left/top to bottom) the sectors II and III. (that all things that are good, are right...which I believe would be likened to hedonism) however, it may be that dots of value on this graph could fall in any sector. When something falls in sectors I or IV, it is a case of mixed values. An action in these sectors would be good but wrong (sector IV) or bad but right (sector I). This is closer to an objective list theory that I would support.
This is illustrative of the objective list theorists reply that it’s "not blame but right and wrong". I can say that, yes...what you did was good. You saved a life. But ultimately, it was also wrong, because in saving that life you indirectly killed millions of jews. So, I guess I’m saying the available subjective facts may be more privy to what is good and bad...and what the objectivist has to say about these two parts of the graph is not very interesting, or it’s problematic in that it can lead to unfair expectations. But, it seems to me that the person who is good but wrong (that saved the baby) is not anywhere worse off than someone who did the bad but right thing. (To let the baby drown) (There need be no implicit premise here about which value holds the most sway [that rightness is better than goodness or vice-versa]). They still, have something to regret on their conscience...and, as objected, it is not possible to know if the drowned baby was indeed going to grow up to be Hitler if the baby drowned.
Although it would be arguably better to be both right and good. This is not always possible. And I do not think morality holds someone as any worse for messing up in one respect or the other (although you will objectively be not as well off, and this is just a sad fact of life). It is only when you have done something both subjectively bad and objectively wrong that morality should really start shaking its finger...or something like that. I’m not sure if I got that as clear and as I thought it would be. It’s probably full of muckiness, and objection-ability, but I’m okay with that. Discuss!
Often an argument against the "objective rightness" view is that it doesn’t leave much room for fairness. Eg. Someone could do something that is by all considerations of available data, what appears to be the best outcome subjectively, but still be wrong. Like in the baby Hitler example; it seems like the right thing to do is to save the baby (assuming the future is still unknown) because all facts at hand considered, it is the good thing to do. When objectivists say that this is wrong because of the unknown facts, this is an unfair expectation of morality (to know the impossible facts, eg. That the baby is going to grow up to kill lots of innocent Jews).
Despite the regret argument, this is where I think the objective theorist can save herself. It requires a comparison of the values "right and good". It seems to me, someone could have done what was good, but that good was the wrong thing to do. One could do a graphic representation where one axis is goodness of a thing, and another axis is rightness. Some people might believe that dots of worth can only fall in the sector that is both positively good and positively right (or positively wrong, and positively bad) Eg. (Numbered right to left/top to bottom) the sectors II and III. (that all things that are good, are right...which I believe would be likened to hedonism) however, it may be that dots of value on this graph could fall in any sector. When something falls in sectors I or IV, it is a case of mixed values. An action in these sectors would be good but wrong (sector IV) or bad but right (sector I). This is closer to an objective list theory that I would support.
This is illustrative of the objective list theorists reply that it’s "not blame but right and wrong". I can say that, yes...what you did was good. You saved a life. But ultimately, it was also wrong, because in saving that life you indirectly killed millions of jews. So, I guess I’m saying the available subjective facts may be more privy to what is good and bad...and what the objectivist has to say about these two parts of the graph is not very interesting, or it’s problematic in that it can lead to unfair expectations. But, it seems to me that the person who is good but wrong (that saved the baby) is not anywhere worse off than someone who did the bad but right thing. (To let the baby drown) (There need be no implicit premise here about which value holds the most sway [that rightness is better than goodness or vice-versa]). They still, have something to regret on their conscience...and, as objected, it is not possible to know if the drowned baby was indeed going to grow up to be Hitler if the baby drowned.
Although it would be arguably better to be both right and good. This is not always possible. And I do not think morality holds someone as any worse for messing up in one respect or the other (although you will objectively be not as well off, and this is just a sad fact of life). It is only when you have done something both subjectively bad and objectively wrong that morality should really start shaking its finger...or something like that. I’m not sure if I got that as clear and as I thought it would be. It’s probably full of muckiness, and objection-ability, but I’m okay with that. Discuss!
posted by Tommy G! at
9:44 PM
1 Comments:
I agree with Tom. The objectivist should handle the determination of right v wrong, while the subjectivist should handle the good and bad. Right and wrong seem to take into consideration all of those omniscient things that normal humans cannot seemingly know. Good and bad seem, to me at least, to be based on what you could possibly know at the moment.
In the case of the voter that was brought up in class it may not be right to vote without know as much as you can about the candidates, as many informed voters would probably agree. However, it was still a good thing to vote knowing what you did, it is your civic duty, and it is your prerogative to voice your opinion regardless of how much you know about the people running for office. It would seem odd to me to say it was a bad thing to vote, I know a little bit about the candidates, enough for me to make a decision (in this case knowing republican or democrat may be enough.) If voting made me happy, knowing what I know, then it raised my well-being. In the end it may not have been the right thing to do however, because maybe I was the deciding vote that sent a bad person into office that ended up changing the nation for the worse.
Overall, in order to judge something at right or wrong you would seemingly have to know everything about the situation; all of the consequences, all of the facts of the before and the after in order to adequately judge that. Good and bad seem to be based on the here and now, on what you can know going into a situation. They are based on what you do in reference to what you know (to the saver, they were saving a baby, not baby Hitler.)
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Jen Ming, at 12:03 AM
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