Did you hear? A is sleeping with her boss; B is going to be crushed!

We discussed in class how options seem to take away objective morality due to the fact that they let you put yourself first for the most part. I find the idea of options to be an intriguing one, but (I think Zac said it) when the idea of options and objective morality not really syncing up came into play I realized I could not really go with options.

Putting oneself first is something we are often told to do, we are told to make sure we take care of ourselves, or at least, we are told to make sure we do not forget about ourselves, and that there are times where we must put ourselves first. But, morality does not really hold to this. There are cases, like cases where your life is on the line, where we are told by morality to take care of ourselves first and foremost. But, there are also times where, at least certain, theories would have our lives be sacrificed for others. Options seem to always let us out of this predicament. We would never have to greatly put ourselves out in order to be morally good.

This may not seem like such a bad thing, but I think that objective morality is the only way morality would really work out. It does not make sense to have a subjective morality. It would change from agent to agent, there would be no set basis of goodness and badness. There would only be goodness for one and goodness for another, and they may conflict to the point where one agent is harmed. Subjective morality cannot seemingly protect people from harm. Morality should be able to protect people’s rights and lives, to at least a certain extent. But an objective morality does not seem capable of this.

Say two people are married. Agent A and agent B. A is trying to get a raise at work. This would improve A’s well-being. A’s boss says that if A sleeps with him that A will get the raise. A’s doing this would greatly harm B’s well-being. If morality was objective, it seems as though it would protect B’s well-being. But if it were subjective then it would seem to allow A to follow through with this affair for her own gain.

my intuitions

This probably won't come out as much of an argument, but I do have some thoughts. What is the point of morality? If someone is immoral, so what? I think the reason that being immoral is a problem is because generally the things people see as immoral are things that they wouldn't themself do, or are things that their intuitions tell them are wrong. However, where do these intuitions come from? For the most part I'd say these intuitions are derived from ideas a person obtains from his or her family, friends, church, culture, etc. These intuitions are based upon ideals instilled upon them by 100s of people, and they are intuitions that for the most part are globally held. Say we lived in a world in which it was widely accepted that promises were allowed to be broken for no reason. Furthermore, let's say in a discussion of ethics we saw this practice as immoral. Thus, we consider all of society to be immoral in their handling of promises. So what? So all of society is immoral. What does that mean if no one notices or cares about it? Immorality in that case just becomes a word. It does not change people's minds about their practices, it does not make them bad people in the eyes of anyone else including themself. So why care if they are immoral? What's the point of morality? To me, when I consider my actions, I consider morality. I feel that morality is a force that tells people what we can and can't do. If I do something that is widely accepted as immoral, or something that maybe I on a more strict definition of morality see as wrong than I feel immoral, I feel like in that moment I am a bad person lacking in character and I work to avoid such actions in the future, and make any apologizes about my immoral actions that are needed. However, in the case of most of these options, intuitions of society say that while giving everything you can to starving people is highly admirable, it is not required. The whole of society outside of a select few agree with this thought. So say I become one of the select few. I live my life that way. I then place myself on a pedastal and have to agrue that everyone else in the world besides the select few are immoral. If I tell people that I don't think it will invoke the same feelings that I discussed earlier of when I engage in something the majority feels is immoral however. I feel that they will shrug it off arguing that it is ridiculous to expect that. I feel as though when someone goes and tells the majority of the world that they are immoral, the word immoral will lose all weight. Morality as a force becomes useless. If no matter what one does they are seen as immoral, why follow other rules of morality? If I'm already a terrible person, I might as well just act on that. Maybe intuitions aren't always right, and maybe morality shouldn't allow for options. However, I feel that if morality is truly seen in this way it will actually lose force for all of morality. It won't change how people act, it will only deter them from upholding other morals, and this to me, counters morality's purpose.

Why Intuitions Fail Us in Optionality

Modern analytic philosophy, in general, seems to be a conflict between intuitions and rigorous arguments against them. “Intuitions” refer to the views that most people come initially have, before a rigorous analysis of their beliefs. Although “intuition” is used more, I tend to prefer “common sense” as a description of these views. This clearly expresses the separation philosophical intuitions have from “a woman’s intuition” and the beliefs that people who lack common sense have.

I usually take the side of intuitions in philosophy, and I believe that we ought to, as a practice. Unless an irrefutable argument is presented against the common sense view, we ought to stick with our intuitions. I tend to apply this principle quite often: even when an argument appears irrefutable, I will usually stick to my beliefs for a while, attempting to find a counter-argument.

So why, then, do I agree fully-heartedly with Singer and Unger, even though we don’t live the way that their argument claims we should? I believe that, in this specific case, we have a very good reason to doubt our intuitions. In other paradigmatic cases of common sense vs. philosophical arguments (freedom of the will, existence of perceived objects, existence of constraints against the good), we can act impartially for the most part. However, the demandingness of morality is a stickier issue. A large part of moral education is learning to be other-serving, instead of self-seeking. We have a natural tendency to be selfish. To write morality so that it is comfortable is a strong temptation, but there is no reason to think that it should be so. This is why I am skeptical of my intuitions in optionality, and in the end, side against them.

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Poking Peter Singer

I have no initial ideas why Singer provokes me to an ad-hominem sort of attack like I came up with in class today. I’m usually pretty good at not doing that. Maybe it was the idea coming into this piece that I should poke him. I don’t know. But something about the way he writes, or his expectations just make one want to see if he applies them with fairness to himself as he is to the rest of the world. Which does not do anything to weaken his arguments of course, he just makes himself somehow poke-worthy. But respecting him and his arguments beyond that, the place I am most tempted to attack his argument is the first premise.
Peter finds this particular kind of attack (I think) to be the most absurd, given his statement that he doesn’t need to argue the view that "suffering from death and lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad" and that "people can hold all sorts of eccentric positions, and perhaps from some of them it would not follow that death by starvation is in itself bad." This, on Peter Singer’s part is an ad-hominem attack, which might be why I felt so inspired to respond likewise. In essence, he attacks the person who would argue against his first premise saying that they would be "eccentric" and he also implies they hold views that are impossible to argue one way or the other. His statement is cleverly worded to say that the position is the thing that’s eccentric, but eccentric views are generally not held except by those who are themselves eccentric. The ad-hominem attack is only a veiled step away.
Yet I do not think a theory of the good which does not hold this to be intrinsically bad is that incoherent, inarguable, or eccentric. Kelly was helpful in pointing out to me Socrates' work as a good candidate for such a theory. Socrates held the view that no harm can come to a good man. In other words, as long as someone was truly of good character, even if she lived a life of complete suffering and died a starving Bengalian, she would still have a worthwhile life. No wrong could have been done to her in her starving to death, because if she were truly good it would not matter. The effects of hedonistic suffering do not matter quite so much to an objective list theorist with character on their list. Just as I believe a proper theory of the good goes beyond that of hedonist appeals pleasure, this holds a corollary (which I think is often under-represented in philosophy) that basic carnal fears should be discluded (or at least considered merely a small part of the picture) from a theory of the bad. Basic fears and pains like suffering arise from the same place and reasons as hedonistic desires (they are the natural opposites of these values). But, if one discounts hedonism, one should also look beyond suffering for an objective list of evils.
It is not hard to arrive at a morally sufficient reason for suffering to exist. John Hick in his writings against the problem of evil, (although he doesn’t realize himself how well he succeeds) shows how most evil, even gratuitous evil can be explained by its instrumental worth to character development. He thinks there is more of a problem with extreme disproportionate amounts of hedonistic evil, and he (I think mistakenly) appeals to mystery to explain them. However, he DOES have an argument for a way for those extreme disproportionate amounts of suffering to fit into character right after this errant appeal to mystery. Basically, I read him to say that seemingly gratuitous suffering "contribute[s] to the character of the world as a place in which true human goodness can occur and in which loving sympathy and compassionate self-sacrifice can take place." In other words, true (and valuable) human virtue could not come into being without such an instrumental good as hedonistic displeasure. One could not be truly compassionate if there was no suffering to inspire sympathy, etc.
At any rate, I think views that hold suffering not to be intrinsically bad are (at least) not as incoherent and eccentric as Peter Singer makes them out to be. And if so, proponents of these type of theories, like myself, have good reason to think his arguments though valid, are unsound via the first premise. Or...you can go ahead and call me crazy like Peter Singer did.

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Donnagan Gone Again

My main objection to Donnagan, as I mentioned in class is the part where he denies that one can make a self-sacrifice that would "be at the cost of that faculty in the giver, or of his life." And he gives the example: "One may not blind oneself to save another from blindness." I find this to be incoherent on his part, especially since he is a fan of autonomy. I can see WHY he would object that, because it does lower one’s ability to have autonomy in some sense, but it is, I think severely more constraining on someone’s autonomy not to be able to make such choices or heroic sacrifices. Of course, I acknowledge the concern raised in class that one shouldn’t kill one’s self for a bag of skittles. So, I think self-sacrifice isn’t a limitless thing. But, for fans of autonomy, I think they will not want it limited in such a strict way as Donnagan is implying. For it is a funny sort of autonomy, where you cannot make a choice to give what you have to give. Again, I don’t want to push this too far. But I think things like what Tinkerbell did for peter pan (which is my nerdy, example...because, I love that story, and I have all the Pan-related movies on DVD, and...I mean...nothing, you saw NOTHING!) Eg. Poisoning herself because she knew it was the only way to stop him from drinking the poison himself; is a very heroic, and morally praiseworthy act. It may be supererogatory, but I do not think the autonomy theorist would want to disculde it as something of moral worth like Donnagan appears to be doing. Not that I’m an autonomy theorist...just I think it’s an odd thing for Donnagan to claim that’s all. I guess you DO lose some of your most precious autonomy when you are faced with such an action. But, I think you lose almost as much autonomy if the option is closed to you, and you must never be allowed to freely make that choice. Or something like that.

Stuff, et cetera

Perhaps not essential to the questions of the Donagan piece, but morally interesting none the less is the value of religion in morality. Donagan's tone seems to suggest that morality with religion is somehow tainted as if it were less of a science than it should be. I do not know that morality "without religion" is purely moral so much as it is merely a humanist or secular philosophy and that too is a religious bent. I guess what he means is religious objections pertaining to Divine command. However he later speaks of apostasy as something immoral and that suicide would be better. This seems inconsistent as he appears to contradict himself. (Though perhaps he is speaking as if he were a follower of a religion) However he does seem to place some value on one's one convictions so much so that death would be preferable than to them up. Still I am not sure if in that case that suicide is appropriate. Let me explain. If upon threat of death one refuses to give up one's convictions, religious or otherwise, and one is killed, one has not committed suicide. One has instead been murdered. One did not will or intend for his own death but rather it was thrust upon him for refusing apostasy. I think though that what Donagan has in mind was rather that by commiting suicide one prevents his enemies from forcing them to do things against their wills. One example that I have in mind for this is that of the Jewish Zealots who faced the Romans in battle for Jerusalem(70 AD). Knowing that they were hopelessly outnumbered the Zealots killed their families and then themselves instead of surrendering to the Romans. To this I would respond that it is no testament to one's people or oneself to kill oneself rather than face the enemy. It is better then to let your blood be on your enemy's hands and better still to avoid or defeat one's enemy. The worst that one's enemy can do is to kill you, so why do it for them? Furthermore instead of avoiding a dehumanizing event one has already submitted to one's enemy. While still breathing one has done no such thing.

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Special Obligations to Community and Family

I want to defend the idea that no special obligations arise from societal roles. We had been talking about this in class, a bit, with the case of the firefighter and the burning WTC. There were different versions: one where the firefighter was off-duty, another where he was on-duty, a third where he had retired but was still fully capable, and a fourth where he never became a firefighter, but had all the necessary knowledge and training. From these cases, I believe it is clear that the firefighter’s obligations arise from his ability to aid, and not his social role. If anyone is not convinced, then here, rapid-fire, are more cases to hopefully tip the scale: a single (so that familial obligations don’t muddy the waters) British fireman is on holiday in New York City on September 11th. (He has an obligation to aid) Now, imagine that the British fireman is on holiday in Paris on September 11th. (He does not have an obligation to aid.) Suppose that the off-duty American firefighter is in Paris on vacation (Neither does he have an obligation). In all of these cases, the obligation tracks with the ability to aid, and not the “role of being a firefighter”.
A vastly different role is that of a child. The fireman entered his role through a choice, serves his community through his role, and performs some sort of activity that qualifies him as being in that role. I believe that these are all necessary conditions for a role to be social. Being a son or daughter does not satisfy any of those. While “Being a child” is a relational role, it is familial instead of social. Familial obligations are difficult for any moral theory. Although (nearly) everyone agrees that children have obligations to their parents, parents to their children, siblings to each other, children to grandparents, and so on, these obligations often seem arbitrary and irrational. This is especially true when the family member one has an obligation towards is not a person one would normally associate with.
There are thus two questions that I have about obligations familial roles. How could such special obligations arise without any promise-making or choice, and why in the world do such obligations exist?

Sorry for the lateness

With the fall break and all I got off track on which week was my week to post and to respond. So now nearly 16 hours late, here I go. I think my main issue with the Tom the murderer case is that it is only the last lawyer in town that is not allowed to opt out. Why is it alright for every other lawyer to opt out except the last? Why can't the last lawyer opt out and one of the original lawyers be forced to take the case? All of the arguments thus far refer to only the last lawyer in town. Everyone seemed to agree that if there was another lawyer to take the case then it was permissible to opt out. So again, why is it ok then and not for the last lawyer?

I feel it is permissible to opt out even if you are the last lawyer in town. I concede that a person has the right to a defense, but I feel the lawyer's right to opt out holds more weight than the murderer's right to a defense. If it is ok for every lawyer but the last to opt out, I feel as if we are punishing the lawyer for being the last. We are putting the rights of a murderer above the rights of a law abiding citizen. I understand that defense lawyers should know what they are getting themself into, but if they feel strongly enough that defending a given person would be wrong they should be allowed to opt out even if they are the last in town. This is not meant as a personal attack against the murderer. It is not meant as a purposeful denial of his rights. Instead I see it as a protection of the defense lawyer's rights. When someone breaks the law, I feel that they forfeit some of their rights. The state attempts to keep as many of them as possible still intact, but I think that it is more important to protect the law-abiding lawyer's rights than the murderer's who forfeited their rights the moment they murdered someone. I see citizenship as a contract to a degree. You abide by the law, pay your taxes, etc., and in return you are granted your rights. If you do not keep your end of the bargain, the state cannot be held responsible for its possible inablity to uphold all of your rights.

Tom a murderer?

With regard to the case of Tom the murderer. It has been said that a lawyer should not be forced to defend him in the following case: Tom admits to committing the murder. It has been said that a lawyer should not have to defend someone that he knows is guilty because it would be introducing a harm. However, even if the lawyer can be certain of Tom's guilt (which I posit he may not be on Tom's testimony alone) he is NOT introducing a harm by defending Tom. The adversarial judicial system has been developed as a crucible for melting away the slag to get to the facts of the case. If there is no pressure from the defense the crucible will crack from the overwhelming pressure of the state. Tom is owed legal defense to ensure that he is receiving that which he JUSTLY deserves. If the means by which we convict Tom are faulty then the sentence that is produced for Tom is also faulty. Furthermore, the requirement of a legal defense is also for the purpose of protecting oneself from oneself. It is inherently possible that Tom might admit to the murder out of coercion. It might be the case that he is being paid to take the hit for some Mobster. In which case the legal defense will protect him from that as well. Perhaps Tom is mentally unstable, and claims to have committed the murder out of some misguided desire for notoriety. The point is that ones own admission and confession does not prove guilt and the mechanisms of the judicial system are for the purpose of proving guilt or innocence in the most objective way possible. For this reason, the last lawyer in town has NO moral right to opt out.
Even if Tom is ACTUALLY guilty the lawyer certainly does not defame his own character by defending Tom. In fact by defending Tom he is demonstrating his good character by seeking the higher goods of Truth and Justice. The lawyer's service in the judicial system is for that purpose. The real harm then would be not defending Tom.
The case of the Physician in Physician Assisted Suicide is not analogous to the above case of the lawyer defending the guilty. The conditions are completely different. While the function of the lawyer is to make the wheels of justice turn, to engage in a logical and adversarial fact finding mission in order to promote the Goods of Truth and Justice, the Physician's function is to promote Health and the inherent beauty of Healthy Life. Even if the Physician's function includes PAS it would only make the difference that much greater because the Physician does not attempt to discern the objective truth of a possible crime that is what really happened; No his function, his craft is the care of the body and not the craft of Rhetoric and Logic. Both have some responsibility for the things that happen to those in their charge, but their difference in function makes all the difference in the world. Justice is concerned with what someone deserves according to what acts he as committed and intended et cetera. 'Physic' on the other hand is merely concerned with the continued existence of the physical body.
While the charge of a lawyer may be sentenced to death, the lawyer's part in this was to help ensure that this was really deserved or not based on the truth of the matter insofar as the court has been able to discern. He is not held accountable for that because he did his part in promoting the good of Justice. The Physician on the other hand is himself directly an arbiter of Life and Death and so the things that come from his hand do weigh upon his conscience. It seems appropriate that a Physician should be able to opt out of PAS and have a right to do so even as everyone has the right to legal counsel. It would be he who made the decision to comply with the patient's request and he who prescribed the lethal dose, he who knowingly assented to this.
So if the Physician has moral objections to being a part of PAS then his right to refuse consent should be upheld. Notice that the lawyer on the other hand prescribes nothing, and wills nothing except the rule of law and justice for all.

uhh, i guess this is kinda long. oh wells!

We had the case in class today of “the last lawyer in town” defending Murderer Tom. It was said that Tom has a right to a defense lawyer. I said that the lawyer – fully knowing that Tom actually committed the murder because Tom admitted to it – has the right to opt out of defending Tom from the huge power of the state because if the lawyer does not feel it is right to defend someone who is guilty. Say that this “this last lawyer in town” does not feel it is morally right to defend Tom, and he also feels that it would be morally wrong to try and get Tom a lesser sentence, then I believe that the lawyer has the right to opt out, even if he is Tom’s last resort.

I compared this to the case of a doctor who has a patient who wants to be euthanized. It was said that these cases are not analogous because in one case you are preventing a harm (saving Tom from having to face the state on his own, and possibly saving him from the death penalty) and in the other case you are introducing a harm (ending the life of a patient (granted the patient asks for this with a rational mind.)) However, I see it as in one case the lawyer has the right to opt out of an action he feels it morally wrong and this will prevent him from harming his character and in the other case the doctor is doing the same thing: opting out of an action he feels it morally wrong and preventing the harm of his character. I feel that the lawyer and the doctor have the right to opt out of doing something they feel is morally wrong. They have the right to prevent a personal harm.

Also, another analogy between the cases is this: Tom introduces himself to the harm of the wrath of the state by killing a person and the patient introduces himself to the harm of his own death by asking to be euthanized. Tom knows the repercussions of killing in this society, and the patient knows the repercussions of euthanasia (it is odd to state it as a repercussion, but I feel it is an acceptable way to put it.) They both know when they perform their action (killing and asking) that they are introducing themselves to harm. In Tom’s case it may just be the possibility of harm, because if he doesn’t get caught he can’t be held accountable by the state, but he is still knowingly introducing himself to the harm. I feel the cases are analogous enough to illustrate my point that the lawyer has the right to opt out of defending someone in a case where he feels it is morally bad to help them. He has just as much right to opt out as the doctor who feels it is morally wrong to assist in suicide/death.

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I have no idea if I've got this objection right...but here's my thoughts anyway.

In class today I attempted to defend the Aristotelean appeal to character against the objection that we put the harm in the wrong place. Eg. the shakedown of moral constraints into character as the moral factor which is doing the actual work puts the wrong inside the agent and not the recipient. Common sense intuition says that when wrong has been done to Amy, Amy has been wronged. Someone has not merely harmed their own character by this act. It seems that saying "doing harm is morally wrong because of the character it takes to cause it" places the wrongness in the wrong place. My initial answer (which Im not sure I’ll want to stand by) was to appeal to some level of contingency: saying that, wrongness being generally located in the agent does not exclude harm being done to Amy. There seems to be a way in which the fact that harm was caused to Amy can actually have a negative effect on the character. There are cases, like with killing Amy, where a person’s character is worsened precisely because Amy was harmed by their action. I immediately qualified this as not being a necessary contingency, for there are times when (like out of a matter of bad luck) a person of good character can cause something wrong. Or an act of good character can simply turn out to be disastrous, and character may not be worsened in these cases. The objection to this was then something about Moral Luck. (Which may or may not have been so much a problem, I forget what answer I may have eventually come up with.)
Instead I want to take a different tack: The objection, if I understand it correctly, could be restated like this: The character-lover seems to be saying that when Adam kills Amy Adam is hurting his character more than Amy. For if Amy is wronged, that appears to have no actual moral weight (unless you take a contingency view like I toyed with above). But it is a rare case indeed when performing a morally wrong action hurts one’s character. For on the character view, it is not the act itself that is morally wrong (thus damaging), but the moral character it takes to do it that makes the act so damaging. To say that someone damages their character by doing some act or another, assumes the act in and of itself is morally wrong. This begs the question for the character theorist. For someone to perform an apparently morally wrong act, their character must already be changed before the act takes place. (Or, I will argue, the act is not actually morally impermissible.) Adam wronged his character long before he killed Amy, when he formed the intentions/vices necessary to do so. To say that by the act itself Adam damages his character is incoherent on my view. So, in essence, I am making the distinction that normally morally wrong acts are an expression of a bad character, not an agent in the formation of one. So the extent that the wrong done to Amy is of moral significance, is not in and of itself, but it is important in reference to the character that was behind it. For it is still worse for a person to act from a bad character than merely to have one.
What then about killing out of good intentions/character? The only cases I find this to be a coherent example are possibly cases of self defense, or trolley cases. Surely one doesn’t think a person’s character is damaged when the act of killing (or harming) is that well justified. If it is likeable to the fan of a threshold on a constraint, then it is not something that harms one’s character (or is even anywhere close to being wont of a bad character). Maybe I am too hasty to think this, but I cannot think of any examples of a person with truly good character performing morally offensible actions, that are not so excused. One might do the wrong thing for the right reasons, but is it possible to do the wrong thing with the right character? And if it is, does this really damage ones character? Or, if you are doing the wrong thing for the right reason, is it the case that your character is already subject to some sort of flaw? Or, are you excused from blame in these cases, and are simply, as a sad matter of fact, wrong? I am inclined to think the latter, and since there is an excuse from blame, there is, I think, a resiliance of charater. But maybe there is ia case I'm just not thinking of that makes that a difficult view to hold.
If the objection goes more along the lines of: it appears on the common view, that a thing is bad because Adam does a wrong TO Amy, and not merely because Adam was exhibiting bad character...then I might have to appeal to something more like the contingency view I had earlier. However, I think it is pretty obvious that, although having a bad character is morally blame-worthy in and of itself (unlike any resulting actions) it is much more blameworthy to act from that character. This is not much of a problem for the character theorist, because it is still the character which bears the moral weight through the instrumentally bad actions. Besides, I would argue that Adam doing wrong TO Amy is not really what drives the moral weight of the situation anyway. (Consider, for instance if Amy was the one person on the trolley track instead of the five.) This reading of the objection would then assume a do/allow distinction, which I have already shown elsewhere to be reducible to matters of character.
If there's another way in which the objection was meant to trouble the character theorist, then I will have to think about a different type of answer. But I cannot remember what that way would be.

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I feel like I’ve been playing the same card for weeks now. Deontologists come up with a constraint, and I think it really isn’t the constraint itself that does the moral work, but the effects such a constraint has on character that really matters. So this time I tried to do something else...I tried to come up with a good challenge for the constraint against lying (besides the fact that it doesn’t do any moral work). I ended up appealing to character anyway, but I still had an interesting thought experiment of it.
Although outside of class, I raised the case of the Dad from Big Fish. For those that haven’t seen the movie, all you need to know is that he is a man who builds his life by telling stretched fictions about himself. All his life he tells these lies, but they don’t hurt anyone...they’re only really about himself, and many of them actually have inspiring morals to them. Basically, he makes himself larger than life. The lies actually serve (as the movie implies) to build a strong character in the father; filling out traits like charm, sense of humor, endearment, the ability to inspire etc.
The only one of Hill’s arguments that I think applies is the fourth one of a "realistic picture of life." The father certainly had a strong mental capacity for autonomy, and a very sophisticated sense of humor about himself (as well as a gift for story weaving). The important life choices aren’t hindered by these lies, in fact his life choices are what feed them and make them more interesting to tell. The morals he attaches to these stretched versions of his life could also inspire others around him to make better life choices than they have. (But I do not want to take focus away from the Father at this point, for it is his case in which I am most interested not necessarily his effect on people around him.) The Father knows himself better than anyone else, so making lies about his life is by no means a mistaken appeal to comfort. The realistic picture of his life argument however, is what the Father is criticized for most in the film. His son thinks these lies are ludicrous, and his father should tell/know the truth of things. However, and this may be as Kelly said: "just a movie trick to get us to think exactly what Tim Burton wants us to think–and not something that would be akin to reality". . .it appears that the Father’s fabricated stories of his past are worth much more than the bare facts. Because of this it is actually more respectful of the Father’s rational dignity to share with him one last fantasy. The son concludes that the most realistic way to look at his father’s life, is through the way he lived it: he lived it larger than life through the stories he told.
Wether or not this is a realistic scenario is probably the first thing a Kantian would question. Could there really be some sort of past the father is ignoring? (Which is slightly implied by the film, although it does not seem anywhere dire enough to make a significant change to his rational life picture if he were to admit it.) Are there people in the movie that we just don’t see who are actually damaged by these lies? Although the type of lies the father told rarely damaged as much as inspired and fantasized, Hollywood could have just overlooked the fact that there must be some significant damage. There is one character in the movie who the Father has apparently neglected in his past, but it is not because of his lies and fantasies that she is hurt. In fact, she is more honored by these tales than anything else. Again, it may just be the Tim Burton bend, but the lies seem to be an odd "admirable" sort of lies.
It seems to me, that IF someone like the Hollywood version of the Big Fish dad existed it would be a hard case for the Kantian to crack. For, it appears to me that the lies in this case actually improve the persons character. But it might not be all that plausible in actuality. This may or may not be a problem for my case.
One major objection might be that "surely lying in this manner cannot be the only way to achieve the kind of admirable character traits that the Big Fish dad had. Therefore his life of lies is not the best it could morally be. He might have "got the right stuff" but he didn’t "do it in the right way". Lying is still wrong. (A man who has all the Big Fish Dad’s qualities etc. is better off morally if he does not lie to get them.) However, this is when I want to pull out my classic "lying is not what’s really doing the work" card. Because, what I believe to be the proper moral evaluative thing here is the type of character it takes to do one thing or another. And it appears to me that if one can have an admirable character arising out of their lying, (as opposed to a rotten one) it is not impinging on anything morally significant.
That might be begging the question...I've been thinking about this too long to tell.
I'm really interested, even if you already posted or even if you're Kelly Sorensen...what other objections can the Kantian have that I might have missed? I forget all what we might have covered in our brief discussions. (I by no means think this to be the most effective challenge to a constraint against lying, I mostly value it for its thought provoking-ness.)

Nazis and Diseases and Pretty Piano Sounds

I also had some things mulling around in my mind that I was unable to bring up in class today. The first thing relates to the comparison of the Villager trying to hide Jews from the Nazis to the case of the doctor (Wexler) lying to the woman about having Huntington’s disease. The second case involves the piano playing boy.

A Nazi officer knocks on the villager’s door and asks if he/she is hiding any Jews. If the villager lies and says that they are not hiding anyone then while there is a chance the lie will be found out and everyone involved will be killed, there is also the chance that nothing will be found out and no one will be killed. If the villager outs the Jews then the Jews will be killed.

In the Huntington’s case, the doctor lies to the woman and says that the woman does not have the disease. The doctor is then informed that if the woman had found out she had the disease she would have killed herself. She had no plans to kill herself if she found out she was disease free.

A large consideration in these cases is death. In the Nazi case the Jews will be killed regardless of their wishes. In the Huntington’s case it is the woman’s choice to kill herself; it is within her realm of control. The woman with the disease should have the opportunity to know what is going on in her life, and her autonomy should be respected. She should be allowed to make her own decision about her life. The Nazi case is not parallel because the Jews cannot decide whether they die or not because it is an external force that will be killing them. I think this distinction is important and brings out that these cases cannot be adequately compared.

The other thing I wanted to bring up was in the case of the boy being forced to play piano. It was said in class that if he is forced he will probably resist, or at least not reach his full potential. While this is highly probable, it is also possible that he could achieve his full potential. This is because there are situations where a child is so afraid of their parent, or just so eager to please them, that while they may not like playing piano they will try their hardest to achieve as much as they can just to placate or please their parent.

Where do babies come from?

I was thinking a lot in class about something, and I never really found a good time to mention it. In talking about benevolent lies and the like, I was debating things such as the stork, Santa Clause, and the Easter Bunny. When any decent parent hear's the dreadful question "Where do babies come from?" from their child, the truth is generally the last thing they want to discuss. Ideally the child never asks and the parent can avoid lying. However, if the child does ask, many feel it is inappropriate to explain the science of sex to a young girl or boy. There are things that are inappropriate for children in the eyes of society, and when brought up, I think common sense morality tells us to avoid the truth in answering the question. Furthermore, there are childhood issues such as the belief in Santa Clause. I realize there are mixed feelings about this, but most don't criticize parents for taking their child to sit on Santa's lap and pretending to mail their childs letters to the North Pole or drinking the milk and eating the cookies left for Santa. In defense of telling the truth in class, we discussed how sometimes withholding the truth is like treating someone as if they're a little kid. What about little kids? Is it OK to treat them as such? Depending on the child, finding out Santa Clause isn't real can be traumatic and maybe telling them from the start would have been better. However, for some children that belief as a kid promotes good behavior (to avoid the naughty list), hope, faith, belief, imagination, etc. As far as discussing where babies come from, I think it may be more traumatic to tell the truth to a child than any lie. Parents lie to their children in these ways because children are not ready for the truth. They are not old enough, mature enough to handle the truth. Let's try the arguments Hill has now. Do parects stunt the growth of their child's psychological capacity for autonomy? Personally I feel that these lies and discovering the truth is part of the growth process. In certain cases the truth could stunt their psychological growth. As far as autonomy, should children really be full in charge of their autonomy to begin with? If given complete freedom and autonomy, children would probably eat nothing but sugar, go to bed real late, and beat up on their siblings more than they already do. There's a reason children aren't given full freedom, and I think part of that is sometimes withholding truth until a child is old enough to handle it with the proper maturity. Autonomy as a right argues that you remove important life choices. I don't really know what important life choices a child makes, but I feel there's nothing too harmful there. As far as distinct human values I think children do want comfort over all else. They pretty much know happy and sad, and they generally prefer happy. Lastly, maybe it does deprive them of a realistic picture of their life, but in a few years they get it back. Further, how realistic is a child's picture of their life to begin with? Their understanding is far below that of an adult. I guess what I'm trying to say is that I don't agree with most lying, benevolent or not, and I do agree that parents should be honest with their children as much as possible, but there are certain cases where benevolent lies to children can be beneficial or at least harmless.

Blog Period 10 Begins

The new blogging period (the tenth one, covering Wednesday and Thursday) starts here.

This is the official separator post beginning that period. Let no one put asunder what the separator post hath separated.

the royal house of Orange

The distinction between intending and forseeing is one of great interest because I do think that there is a certain weight to intentions. However it has also been said that: "the road to Hell is paved with good intentions." While this is certainly indicative of the fact that intentions are not the only relevant moral factor I do not think that intentions should be discounted either. It is certainly not enough to say "oops I didn't mean to kill x" I'm not sure that this is relevant in situations like that. So when are intentions relevant? Intentions are relevant in situations where one wills and not one one does not will or wish for something to happen. In addition they are relevant in situations when one wills and that will is being fulfilled in such a way that involves the fulfilment or neglect of a duty. It seems right to distinguish this from usages where intent refers to one's remorse at not being able to so something. why are these substantially different? Partly I think because intent implies will which seems to imply premeditation or a conscious effort. This seems different from forsight insofar as one does not will the side effect but is aware of it. I'm still not quite sure why this could be important. Maybe the distinction is irrelevant and that for all things there is an absolute. I don't know.

Ectopic Pregnancy and Intend/Foresee

I think that in the case of the ectopic pregnancy, if the doctor were to kill the fetus in order to save the woman’s life the intend/foresee distinction dissolves. Say there was a chance for the fetus to come to term and survive, and say that there was no other way of saving the woman other than to remove the fetus from the tube. This would end up killing the fetus. It is, in a way, a side effect. The doctor could claim that it is permissible to save the woman and kill the fetus on the claim that he did not intend the death; he merely foresaw it as a side effect. But putting the action’s actual permissibility aside, I feel that in foreseeing the death of the fetus as a side effect of removing it to save the woman’s life the doctor takes on the responsibility of the death of the fetus. In consciously knowing it would happen he becomes responsible for it happening. At this point I think that the intend/foresee distinction fades because while he may not have wanted the fetus to die, he still went ahead with a procedure that would end its life. I am not arguing if his action was the morally right choice or not, just that in consciously knowing he accepts the responsibility and culpability of the death of the fetus. In a case like this, and like the hysterectomy case in McIntyre, the distinction fails to be the most weighty thing on the board.

The Eagles Made Me Late

In discussing the case of the pregnant woman today in class, my aim was not to discuss the permissibility or impermissibility of the case, but rather the fact that the intend/foresee distinction was not doing the work. The abortion was a means to the end of saving the woman. In the case, it was necessary for the fetus to die in order to save the woman. Put another way, the woman would die if the fetus lived. Thus the intend/foresee distinction would have to say that it is impermissible for the pregnancy to be aborted to save the woman. Furthermore, it is a bit unnerving to me to say that one would be intending the death of the child, although that seems to be the case. In the language that the intend/foresee distinction uses, one would be intending the death of the fetus, but in common sense morality as I see it, most would not consider it intended murder, but rather the saving of a woman. In any case, the intend/foresee disctinction does not allow the woman to be saved. However, many would think that she can have the child aborted. One explanation for this may use the idea of self-defense. However, if you are of the sort that feels that this idea loses weight when one defends oneself against an innocent person that happens to be a threat, than self-defense loses out. My opinion on the matter is that the abortion is permissible, but of the sort that is less preferred. However, to come to term while knowing you will die is to go above and beyond in that hero sort of way. You would be sacrificing yourself for the child. Thus, I feel that the abortion is permissible on the grounds that the alternative is a form of self-sacrifice. However, here is where I feel character also comes into play. Given the choices, one of greater character would choose to come to term with the child and just hope for the best for them. Even though it is morally permissible to abort the child, it is the lesser preferred choice on the grounds of character. Here is where I feel character affects decisions. It does not tell someone if an act is permissible or impermissible, but instead distinguishes between two acts that are both permissible, but one is better than the other. Also, it allows there to be a distinction between someone with bad intent that happens to act well and someone who meant good and did the same thing. It gives weight to the means prior to the end in order to prevent full consequentialism. I had troubles with consequentialism because I felt there was more to an act than its end result, and I think that the notion of character helps. As for the abortion, I would say don't do it, but I also can't say I'd blame you if you did.