Why Intuitions Fail Us in Optionality

Modern analytic philosophy, in general, seems to be a conflict between intuitions and rigorous arguments against them. “Intuitions” refer to the views that most people come initially have, before a rigorous analysis of their beliefs. Although “intuition” is used more, I tend to prefer “common sense” as a description of these views. This clearly expresses the separation philosophical intuitions have from “a woman’s intuition” and the beliefs that people who lack common sense have.

I usually take the side of intuitions in philosophy, and I believe that we ought to, as a practice. Unless an irrefutable argument is presented against the common sense view, we ought to stick with our intuitions. I tend to apply this principle quite often: even when an argument appears irrefutable, I will usually stick to my beliefs for a while, attempting to find a counter-argument.

So why, then, do I agree fully-heartedly with Singer and Unger, even though we don’t live the way that their argument claims we should? I believe that, in this specific case, we have a very good reason to doubt our intuitions. In other paradigmatic cases of common sense vs. philosophical arguments (freedom of the will, existence of perceived objects, existence of constraints against the good), we can act impartially for the most part. However, the demandingness of morality is a stickier issue. A large part of moral education is learning to be other-serving, instead of self-seeking. We have a natural tendency to be selfish. To write morality so that it is comfortable is a strong temptation, but there is no reason to think that it should be so. This is why I am skeptical of my intuitions in optionality, and in the end, side against them.